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Abstract 
 
It is argued that specificity is inadequate to explain hold-up, as the definition is imprecise as to 
which party incurs a loss if an asset is redeployed. If both parties to a transaction incur a loss when 
an asset is redeployed, neither party can credibly hold up the other party. Also the concept does not 
address expectations. It is the expected loss (not the actual loss) of parties that will drive attempts at 
hold-up. Therefore focusing on specificity when talking hold-up can be misleading. As a 
consequence the concept of importance is introduced. The importance of an asset to a firm is the 
expected loss to the firm if access to the asset is lost. Various determinants of importance are 
discussed by using a formal framework. Implications are forwarded, and it is argued that the 
relative importance of the parties has to change for hold-up to occur. One-sided specific 
investments inherently lead to mutual importance, which mitigates hold-up. Situations without 
specificity can lead to hold-up if expectations are asymmetric. Lastly, hold-up does not imply a 
hold-up problem. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the economic literature (transaction cost economics and beyond) specific investments have been 
given special attention as driving corporate strategic decisions. There are three forces at work. One 
is that, given a specific investment, there is an ex post hazard of hold-up, which is to say that quasi-
rents are appropriated opportunistically (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Williamson 1985). 
Increased specificity increases the hazard and ultimately results in firms internalising transactions as 
a safeguard against hold-up. Secondly, the benefit of an investment that is specific to another party 
only partially accrues to the party making the investment, resulting in in-optimal levels of 
investment ex ante (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995). Integration can in 
some cases result in investments closer to the optimal level. Thirdly, specific investments create a 
situation of bilateral dependency between parties that increases the value of adaptive coordination 
(Williamson 1985, 1991). As specificity increases, the bilateral dependency reaches a point where 
hierarchies, being superior at adaptive coordination, are called for, resulting in the transaction being 
internalised. The third consideration resembles an ex ante anticipation of the second effect kicking 
in at some point in the future when the parties are tied in to each other and changed circumstances 
creates opportunities for new investments that result in gains to both parties. However, a difference 
is Williamson’s emphasis on the direct costs of bargaining.   
This paper will explore the first effect, ex post hold-up when we take investments for given, 
and argue that focusing on specificity is certainly relevant for the possibility of ex post hold-up, but 
focusing exclusively on specificity is inadequate. What matters is the importance of each party to 
the other. In determining the importance of one party to the other, discussing other issues than 
specificity, namely expectations and bargaining, is essential. 
Consider for a moment what a firm about to engage in a transaction will focus on when 
evaluating whether or not there will be hold-up ex post. Hold-up occurs when one party uses the 
fact that he is engaged in a transaction with a second party to increase his own welfare by exploiting 
the second party. For this to happen, one party has to be vulnerable to the other party, and the 
question is what creates this vulnerability. I will argue that if a firm’s expected fall in profits from 
losing access to an asset is positive, it potentially exposes the firm to hold-up. If the firm expects to 
lose no profits from losing access to an asset, there is nothing to exploit for the owner of the asset, 
as the firm will simply turn away if the owner starts to engage in hold-up. In the following I will be 
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referring to the importance of an asset to capture this idea. I will be arguing that importance is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for parties to expect ex post hold-up. 
Although hold-up can take many forms, I will be making my points in a more stylised world, 
where I will take behaviour of one party that changes the terms of access to an asset contrary to the 
will of the other party to constitute hold-up. Thus, in effect, I will focus on hold-up through the 
ability of parties to change the price of access to assets. Since the terms of access will be 
determined by a bargaining game between the two parties, something has to change from the ex 
ante bargaining game (before the asset is accessed) to the ex post bargaining game (after the asset is 
accessed) for hold-up to emerge. In other words, hold-up will only emerge if something changes the 
bargaining strengths and threat points of the parties. Specific assets can influence the bargaining 
game, but I will argue that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the parties to expect hold-up. 
 
2. The concept of importance 
 
The importance of an asset to a firm is defined as the expected fall in profits if access to an asset 
was lost1. For analytical purposes it is useful to introduce two concepts, ex ante value and ex post 
value. Ex ante value is the potential value of an asset to a firm that does not have access to the asset, 
that is, the value from gaining access to the asset. The ex ante value is thus the increase in the firm’s 
expected profit from obtaining access. The ex post value is the expected value of keeping access (in 
a narrow sense) to an asset. In other words, the expected fall in profits from relinquishing access to 
an asset, holding other things equal. Then, for asset A to be important, the ex post value of asset A 
has to exceed the ex ante value of the alternative assets available (calculated as if there was no 
access to asset A). Only if the lost value from relinquishing access to an asset is larger than the 
value that can be obtained from accessing an alternative asset will profits fall from losing access. 
And only if this is the case is the firm vulnerable to hold-up. If the firm can access and alternative 
asset with the same value, the owner of the asset the firm is currently accessing cannot hold up the 
firm as the firm would simply turn away. 
                                                 
1 I will be looking at two parties where one is paying the other for access to an asset. For the owner of the asset the other 
party will be an “asset” that can also be important. For instance, I will talk of the importance of a producer (who is 
paying for access) to a supplier (who owns the asset).  
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The definition of important assets is in some way similar to that of specific assets2. Both are 
expressed in terms of lost value – specific assets in terms of the lost productive value should the 
asset be redeployed to its next best user; and important assets in terms of the expected lost value to 
a firm should access to an asset be lost. However, the two have different focus. Specificity 
considers the lost value to all parties involved in present use net of the benefits to all involved in its 
second best use – thus focusing on the redeployment of the asset, in a sense “following” the asset. 
The focus on the asset means the term in itself does not say who loses value by the asset being 
redeployed. Importance, on the other hand, is concerned with the loss of a particular firm involved – 
thus focusing on the replacement of the asset from the viewpoint of the firm. The term does not 
(directly) consider the value of the asset to alternative users or in alternative uses. This focus points 
to the need to consider terms of access and alternative assets available. In order to do this the 
bargaining game between parties needs to be considered, both ex ante and ex post. Another 
difference is that specificity is defined3 and analysed in terms of actual lost value (e.g. Williamson 
(1991), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Hart (1995)). Importance is defined in terms of 
expected lost value. As will be argued below, expectations alone can drive strategic decisions. The 
“real” importance of an asset is a very complex thing to figure out. Therefore, parties will at most 
have some expectation of the importance of assets (being bounded rational in an uncertain world). 
Consequently, that they will be acting based on these expectations. 
There are two main reasons why an asset can be important. Either because the expectations of 
parties differ or because there are specific assets involved. Barney (1986) describes how differing 
expectations of parties can result in assets having positive value. He argues that if all parties had 
perfect information, all assets would be priced at their gross value. In this way he reduces all 
positive value to divergent expectations by rolling the argument backwards in time. There are two 
reasons this does not imply that importance is only created by divergent expectations. First, 
importance is an ex post concept, and what Barney (1986) is arguing, adapted to this context, is that 
the ex ante value can only be different from zero if expectations differ. Secondly, what matters for 
                                                 
2 Specificity is a concept widely used, and its meaning can be ambiguous. To make clear how specificity is thought of 
here, consistent with both Williamson (1991), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) and Hart (1995), consider the 
following example: There are two firms. Each has generic assets available. The productive value of these assets is 8 to 
firm A and 4 to firm B. One special asset is also available, which has productive value 10 to firm A and productive 
value 7 to firm B. Suppose (for ease of exposition) that the cost of supplying access to the assets is zero. In this context 
the special asset is specific to firm B (while a more narrow view could hold that the asset was specific to firm A as 
10>7). One can deduce this in two ways: In a Williamsonian way by noticing that the productive value is highest when 
firm B has access to the asset (7+8>10+4) – thus productive value is lost if access to the asset was to be transferred 
from B to A; or in a Klein, Crawford, and Alchian/Hart’sk manner by noticing that firm B has the highest value gain 
(and will therefore be willing to pay more) from gaining access to the asset (7-4>10-8). 
3 Although a clear definition is hard to find. 
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strategic choice (and the value of importance) is the situation at the time of the decision. Past 
occurrences leading to the situation are in a sense irrelevant. Hence, the ex ante value can be 
positive, even if both parties hold the same expectations. The existence of specific assets is one 
reason for this. An asset can be specific because it is simply more productive to one user than to 
others. If this is the case, the party to whom the asset is specific can use it to gain positive ex ante 
value. As the gross value of the asset is higher to one party than to others, it puts the party in a 
favourable bargaining position, which can give him a surplus. Specific assets also affect the ex post 
value. As assets are specific either due to a direct loss in productive value from redeployment or 
transaction costs form terminating a transaction, parties become locked in. This creates ex post 
value as it implies a loss from terminating the transaction. As both ex ante and ex post value of 
assets can take on non-negative values for other reasons than divergent expectations, so can 
importance. 
 A more formal analysis will help to clarify the logic of the concepts introduced; and expose 
some of the issues that are relevant for the discussion. 
To be able to make the points in a simple, concise manner while focusing on the first effect of 
interest here, I will make a number of simplifying assumptions. Assume we concentrate our 
attention on a firm that only considers securing access to assets by a hybrid (that is, by a long term 
contract – contrary to owning the asset (hierarchy) or without a contract (market) (Williamson 
1991)). In other words, it drafts an agreement with the owner of an asset specifying the terms of 
access to the asset. As I take the asset for given, the second effect (in-optimal investment level) is 
ignored. Furthermore, assume that if access to an asset is lost, the best response is always to secure 
access to one (single) alternative asset (or none). The argument will take place in a two period game 
(there is a single ex post value). This leaves out considerations for the third effect (future 
adaptation). 
Denote the ex ante value of an asset by A. Then A = α - a, where α is the gross ex ante value 
(the expected increase in profits from gaining access, gross of the cost of access); and a is the 
expected cost of accessing the asset. There are two components to the cost. a = p + c, where p is the 
expected price of access (some discounting of the price of access in the future) and c are the 
expected transaction costs associated with gaining access (costs of finding the right asset, 
bargaining over terms of access, drafting the agreement etc.) 
Now, denote ex post value by E. This makes E = ε - e, where ε is the gross ex post value (the 
expected fall in profits if access is lost, gross of costs saved), and e is the expected costs saved by 
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terminating access. e = q – d where q is the expected price of future access and d are the expected 
transaction costs associated with terminating access (compensation to owner for terminating an 
agreement, costly lawsuit etc.) 
Lastly, denote the importance of the asset by I. This results in I = E - Ã, where E is the ex post 
value of the asset, and Ã = max{0, Ã 1 , … , Ã n}, when there are expectedly n alternative assets to the 
asset in question. Ã n is the ex ante value of alternative asset n. If no alternative assets has positive 
ex ante value, Ã = 0 as it is better not to secure access to any asset. Ã n is calculated as the ex ante 
value of asset n if the firm does not have access to the asset it is replacing. In other words, Ã is the 
ex ante value of the best alternative asset (or zero if no good alternative is available). 
I will now forward some considerations regarding A, E, and I in turn: 
A: There are different ways A > 0. One is due to different expectations of firm and owner. For 
instance, the firm might have a more optimistic expectation of the future value of the asset than the 
owner without the owner realizing this. This can result in him setting a sufficiently low price for A 
to be positive, that is, p < α  - c. 
A second way A can become positive is if the owner believes that the firm is able to secure 
access to an alternative asset (denoted a) that has Aa > 0. This makes the owner believe the firm is 
unwilling to access the asset unless the ex ante value is at least Aa. Since the owner believes A needs 
to be at least as large as Aa for firm to be interested in buying, the owner might lower the price 
making A > 0. If, for instance, the owner believes αa = α and ca = c, and observes pa, he believes he 
has to set p ≤  pa to sell – otherwise Aa > A and the firm would prefer the alternative. But the owner 
could have wrong expectations, as the firm might in fact believe αa = α and ca > c. If this is the 
case, and the owner sets p as high as he believes possible at p = pa, he is giving the firm a larger 
surplus than needed: A = α - p – c = αa - pa - c > αa - pa - ca = Aa. If the alternative asset is priced so 
the firm realized zero value, he would still have positive value from buying A, as A > Aa = 0.  
A last case is when the firm has higher valuation of the asset (net of transaction costs) than 
other firms. In other words, the asset is specific to the firm. Let b denote the firm where the asset 
would be put to second-best use. That makes α - c > αb – cb. Consider the case where the owner can 
only sell access to one firm and there is perfect information4. The owner knows that his alternative 
is to turn to the alternative firm, who will never pay more than αb – cb. Thus, p = αb – cb is the threat 
point of the owner. The firm’s threat point is somewhere between p = αb – cb and p = α - c (as p = 
                                                 
4 In the case where the owner can sell access to several firms, the firms might get a surplus if the owner is not able to 
perfectly price discriminate. 
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α - c ⇔ A = 0)5. If each has positive bargaining power, the result is a price that lies strictly between 
the threat points, that is, α – c > p > α b - cb.  This makes A = α - p – c > α - (α – c) – c = 0. Note 
that the argument can be redone only being driven by the expectations of the parties. It is enough 
that the firm and owner believe that an alternative firm has lower ex ante gross valuation of the asset 
(net of transaction costs) for the argument to hold. Expectations are enough to establish the threat 
point needed for the result. 
E: Turning to ex post value, there are several reasons that the expected gross value of an asset 
can change ex post, that is why ε  ≠ α. First of all, since both α and ε are expected values derived in 
an uncertain world, as time passes the expected gross value of the asset might change. This can be 
due to expectations of the future looking different at a later point in time. Wear and tear might make 
the asset less valuable. It can also be due to experience with the asset. For instance, if the true gross 
value of the asset is εt, and εt > ε, the firm is likely to realize the potential of the asset by accessing 
it, making its valuation of it converge to the true value, ε → εt, as time passes. Immediately after the 
purchase, the ex post gross value will equal the ex ante gross value, that is ε  = α. Therefore, the 
difference between ε  at a later time and α at the time of buying is going to grow as time passes. 
The converse could also be the case – if accessing an asset one might realize ex post that the value 
is lower than expected, making ε < α.  
One can also give a few reasons why E ≠ 0. The reasons advanced to argue that A > 0 carry 
over and explain why E > 0. Additional considerations arise, though. For instance, while the firm 
would never access an asset with negative A, it can end up in a situation where E is negative. 
Consider the case where the firm discovers ex post that ε < α. If this is the case, it might have 
agreed upon a price q that ex post gives the asset negative value. If the transaction costs from 
terminating access are sufficiently low relative to the gain from termination (d < q - ε) then E = ε - 
q + d < 0, and termination would be profitable even before considering alternatives.  
In addition to the arguments made that A can be positive, E can become positive even if A = 0 
and the gross valuation of the asset is the same and an identical asset is accessible at the same terms 
(α = ε and p = q). This is due to the transaction costs of terminating and engaging access: A = 0 
leads to α - (p + c) = 0 ⇔ α - p = c. Hence, E = ε - (q + d) = α - (p + d) = c + d > 0. Some 
surplus is needed to warrant the costs of drafting the initial agreement and commencing access; and 
some costs will arise from terminating the agreement. Both create ex post value. 
                                                 
5 His threat point can be a p < α  - c if other assets with positive value are available. 
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 I: Now, consider importance. Generally, I > 0 if E > Ã. Notice that since Ã ≥ 0, it is a 
necessary condition for the asset to be important that it is ex post valuable, that is I > 0 only if E > 
0. If an asset is not ex post valuable, there is a gain from terminating access without considering 
alternatives. As an alternative is always to do nothing, it is always profitable to terminate access to 
an asset that has negative ex post value. If no alternative asset is available then Ã = 0, and thus I > 0 
if E > 0. Thus, ex post value leads to importance. However, ex post value is not a sufficient 
condition for importance. If alternative assets are available, it is a matter of these being less 
valuable than the asset in question for the asset to be important. Otherwise the asset can be sold and 
an alternative bought with a gain. 
As importance is tied to ex post value of the asset and ex ante value of alternatives, the 
conditions that gives rise to importance is a matter of combining the arguments given above. Higher 
ex post value tends to make the asset important. Low ex ante value of the best alternative tends to 
make the asset important. 
However, rewriting I = E - Ã provides a few insights: I = ε - q + d – (α -  p - c) = 
ε - α + p – q + d + c, with α , p and c being tied to Ã. Thus, the higher the ex post gross value is 
relative to the gross ex ante value of the best alternative, the more important is the asset. The higher 
the price of access to the best alternative asset relative to the price of current access, the more 
important is the asset. The higher the transaction costs of terminating access, the more important is 
the asset. And the higher the transaction costs of accessing the alternative asset, the more important 
is the asset. 
 
3. The implications of importance for hold-up 
 
The implication is that if a firm expects an asset to be ex post important, it has to consider the 
hazard from hold-up if the asset is not owned. Since the firm expects a loss to be associated with 
lost access, the owner of the asset can potentially hold up the firm for the entire importance. I stress 
potentially, because this is not the end of the story. The owner of the asset might also incur a loss 
from the transaction terminating, that is, the firm can be important to the owner. When mutual 
importance is present, this mitigates the hold-up problem, relative to a situation of one-sided 
importance. One party cannot credibly threat the other party to withdraw from the transaction if 
both lose from termination. 
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For instance, consider a supplier and a producer. The supplier makes some generic widget and 
the producer makes some output. The producer wishes to buy widgets from the supplier, and they 
negotiate some terms of delivery. Ex ante there is nothing specific about the widget to the producer, 
but due to the costs of drafting an agreement and costs that would result from termination of the 
transaction (such as a non-productive period due to lack of supplies) the supplier is ex post 
importance to the producer. Does this mean that the producer should expect a hold-up problem ex 
post? Not necessarily. Assume he believes that the supplier will incur a loss of equal magnitude 
from the transaction terminating (the supplier also has to draft a new agreement and might face a 
period with no sales). Then if the terms of access are determined by a symmetric Nash bargaining 
game, he will not expect a hold-up problem ex post, as the outcome of the ex post bargaining game 
will be the same as the outcome of the ex ante bargaining game. If the supplier similarly believes 
the ex post importance of each party to be the same, neither party will push for protective measures 
as a consequence of fear of hold-up. 
So, what matters for hold-up is the importance of the asset to the firm relative to the 
importance of the firm to the owner of the asset. If both are important, both lose from the 
transaction terminating, and the relative importance of the parties determine whether or not hold-up 
can be expected. If the ex post bargaining game is solved by symmetric Nash bargaining, equal ex 
post importance leads to no change in the terms of access, as both parties’ threat points are 
weakened by the same amount. If both parties expect this ex ante, they have no need to fear ex post 
hold-up. Note that the parties merely have to expect the loss to be split. The parties do not need to 
have the same expectations, as long as both expect the importance of each party to be equal ex post. 
Consider the argument, often used, that specific investments are made due to these having 
more value than a generic investment. If a specific investment is made by a supplier to a producer, a 
symmetric Nash bargaining game would result in the gain being split between the supplier and the 
producer. If parties split the costs of terminating the transaction and the producer has nowhere else 
to turn6, there will be no hold-up ex post. As the gain was split, both parties’ threat points are 
weakened by the same amount ex post, and a new bargaining game would result in no change in the 
terms of access, and hence no hold-up. Thus, the specific investment of one party does not 
automatically result in hold-up. What matters is the relative importance of the transacting parties 
                                                 
6 That the producer cannot turn somewhere else will not always be the case, but the reason for this could be that no 
other supplier is available, or that other suppliers, having seen the producer renegade on one supplier, cannot be 
expected to enter a similar deal. Alternatively, it can be so costly for the producer to switch supplier (for example, due 
to a period of no production) that it matches the loss the supplier faces due to the specific investment. 
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that results from the investment. Note that this differs from the hostage models of Williamson 
(1985) and co-specific investment model of Koss and Eaton (1997) in that my arguments do not 
involve bilateral investments. My point is that a one-sided specific investment is likely to lead to 
mutual importance which will mitigate ex post hold-up7.  
Only if the relative bargaining positions change from the ex ante situation to the ex post does 
hold-up emerge. The implication is that if the firm expects the importance of the asset to exceed the 
importance if the firm, he will push for protection (again, assuming a symmetric Nash bargaining 
game). Similarly, if the supplier believes the importance of the firm exceeds the importance of the 
asset, he will push for protection. Thus, if either party expects a large discrepancy in ex post 
importance that puts him at a disadvantage, we can expect the governance choice to be pushed in 
the direction of the firm. This is because a discrepancy in importance changes the ex post 
bargaining positions relative to the ex ante bargaining positions. A specific investment by one party 
to another is one reason the bargaining positions can change, and ex post hold-up can be expected. 
But, as the simple example above pointed to, specific investments are not sufficient for this to be 
the case. 
Nor are specific investments necessary. This can be illustrated by the following example. A 
producer would normally have better information about the output market and its strategy than a 
supplier. Thus, the producer might know the future value of the particular supplies to its strategy, 
contrary to the supplier who might have a more pessimistic view. In this case, an ex ante bargaining 
game will result in a deal that is favourable to the producer relative to the supplier, from the 
viewpoint of the producer. Thus, he believes the importance of the supplier exceeds his importance 
to the supplier, and he can expect the supplier to learn more and more about the importance of the 
supplies as time evolves (can expect the bargaining game to change). As a consequence, he will 
want to secure the favourable terms of access to avoid ex post hold-up. Thus, asymmetric 
information leads the producer to push for safeguards. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The above arguments were made in a stylised world where the only negotiable parameter was the 
price of access. In a real world setting, hold-up can occur through a whole range of measures. 
                                                 
7 However, note the discussion on the investment decision itself below. 
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However, the fact that each party can inflict a loss on the other party will still have a disciplining 
effect on transacting parties – that is, mutual importance can keep transacting parties in line. 
It is also noteworthy that several arguments assumed that bargaining takes place according to 
a symmetric Nash game. This makes the exposition simpler, but the results are not due to this 
assumption. More complicated bargaining games can be introduced without changing the main 
message: the relative bargaining positions of parties has to change from the ex ante to the ex post 
bargaining game for hold-up to emerge. If the producer inherently has more bargaining power than 
the supplier, he will capture a bigger share of the pie in the ex ante bargaining game. This will, 
ceteris paribus, make the supplier more important to the producer than the producer to the supplier. 
In other words, the producer will lose more from the transaction terminating than the supplier. This 
will “keep him in line” ex post, even though he has more bargaining power. 
Also the arguments are silent on the ex post costs of bargaining. As Foss and Foss (2002) and 
Foss (2002) stress, these costs have implications. In this context, introducing them might even 
support the point made, as the relative importance of parties would have to get further out of line for 
hold-up to pay of, as each party can foresee costs from engaging in bargaining. Again, what matters 
is the expectation of the outcome of the bargaining game. If the expectation is that the bargaining 
game will not lead to a positive change that exceeds the expected costs from engaging in the 
bargaining, there is no motivation to engage in bargaining. Thus, transaction costs might lead to less 
hold-up, as the expected gain from bargaining would have to be larger for bargaining to pay of. 
Fairly unmentioned has been the implication if parties disagree on their relative strengths and 
threat points. This would result in more complicated bargaining, and the results would be of a more 
ambiguous nature. One consequence will be that parties can be expected to use resources to 
influence the expectations of the other party (Foss and Foss 2002, Foss 2002). If expectations are 
totally out of line, a possibility is that agreements break down. If expectations area somewhat in 
line, the gist of the arguments should still apply. 
A point worth mentioning is that the analysis takes assets for given. If one includes the 
(specific) investment decision itself, the bargaining game will change from before the investment is 
made to after the investment is made, as a specific investment implies sunk costs. For instance, a 
supplier investing in a machine specific to a producer will when bargaining ex ante over the cost of 
each output have the average cost as his threat point (assuming there is only one supplier), while ex 
post it will be the marginal cost (assuming the investment is “totally” specific). As sunk costs will 
create a difference between average and marginal costs, the threat point will change, and the 
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supplier can expect to be held up. However, hold-up does not necessarily imply a hold-up problem. 
If the supplier expects the ex post bargaining game to result in a price that is above his average 
costs, he will still expect profits from making the specific investments. Therefore, it is not obvious 
that he will be unwilling to make the investment without safeguards – even though there is ex post 
hold-up, he might have no other investment options (or the option might be to make an investment 
in some generic technology, where the output will be prone to competition that result in small 
profits). If several suppliers are competing ex ante for the deal, ex post hold-up might not even 
occur. Each supplier will have a weak ex ante bargaining position – that is, each cannot expect to 
split the surplus 50:50 with the producer as he can play the suppliers out against one another. This 
might result in the ex ante and ex post bargaining games resulting in the same price, and no 
safeguards would be called for8. 
Lastly note that since human assets cannot be owned, it is never possible to guarantee that 
human assets do not become inaccessible. The arguments above (at times) implicitly revolved 
around non-human assets. However, the analysis points to mutual importance being effective in 
securing access to human assets. This is in line with Hart (1995), who argues that human assets are 
tied in by the specific investments they make to the non-human assets constituting the firm, and 
Rajan and Zingales (2001) who argue in terms of human assets’ specific investments to an already 
existing web of specific investments. 
An objection might be forwarded that abandoning perfect expectations opens up for all kinds 
of arbitrary expectations for explaining hold-up. Let me offer some arguments why introducing 
imperfect expectations has value added. First of all, for firms competing in the real world 
expectations clearly matter and are clearly not perfect. Think back a couple of years to the booming 
IT-years. Thus, imperfect expectations clearly play a role, and this role should be examined. 
Secondly, abandoning perfect expectations does not imply introducing completely irrational 
expectations. As a parallel to the notion of feasible foresight (Williamson 1985), we might talk of 
reasonable expectations. It might in fact be argued that not introducing imperfect expectations with 
respect to the value of assets is inconsistent with the assumption of bounded rationality. Thirdly, 
this whole exercise has been comparative. What matters for hold-up is whether the bargaining game 
changes. In other words, explaining the exact expectations are not necessary for predictions if we 
have an idea of the relative expectations of parties and how these might change over time. A 
                                                 
8 Note that the under-investment problem described by Hart (1995) will not be solved. This will persist as long as the 
benefits from the investment are split. However, these problems are not due specifically to specific investments, but 
arise whenever there are mutual gains from trade and more than one party has positive bargaining power. 
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comparative analysis and a notion of reasonable expectations can yield predictions, as the tentative 
one forwarded at the end of section 3. Lastly note that even with perfect expectations of the value of 
assets the argument that specificity is inadequate for explaining hold-up stands. Specificity is 
imprecise in awarding loses to parties and thus inadequate for explaining the bargaining game that 
determines whether hold-up will take place. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
I have argued that what I have termed importance is what matters for the nature of ex post hold-up. 
If parties expect the relative importance to change as time evolves, hold-up can be foreseen, and 
safeguards in the form of long-term contracts or internalising the transaction might be called for. 
However, an expectation of hold-up is not necessarily a problem if parties are satisfied with the 
situation hold-up leads to. 
Specificity inadequately addresses these issues. There will often be no need for bilateral 
specific investments or hostages to avoid hold-up in a market setting. Thinking in lines of 
importance is thus necessary for adequately describing hold-up. Specificity inherently leads to 
mutual importance, which mitigates hold-up. 
Considering importance rather than specificity as driving hold-up arguable has better 
explanatory power. However, as added complexities are introduced, it comes at a cost of predictive 
power. This is a trade-off to consider when evaluating the merit of the arguments forwarded here. 
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